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ABSTRACT: What is it for two people to think of an object, natural kind or other entity 
under the same mode of presentation (MOP)? This has seemed a particularly difficult 
question for advocates of the Mental Files approach, the Language of Thought, or other 
‘atomistic’ theories. In this paper I propose a simple answer. I first argue that, by parallel 
with the synchronic intrapersonal case, the sharing of a MOP should involve a certain 
kind of epistemic transparency between the token thoughts of the two thinkers. I then 
explain how shared words help bring about this transparency. Finally, I show how this 





What is it for two people to think of an object, natural kind or other entity 
under the same mode of presentation (MOP)? Different theories of MOPs 
(or singular concepts) give different answers. Following Fodor (1998), I 
shall distinguish two broad kinds of theory.1 All versions of inferential role 
semantics (IRS) hold that a MOP is individuated entirely by its inferential 
role, which consists of epistemic properties such as inferential relations to 
specific other concepts, or conditions of warranted application. 2  All 
versions of atomism, on the other hand, deny this; they agree with IRS that 
MOPs are what capture the fine-grained cognitive roles of the thoughts of 
which MOPs are constituents, but they deny that differences in MOPs are 
                                               
1  Fodor 1998 mainly uses the word ‘concept’, though he does also use ‘mode of 
presentation’ in the same way that I am using it here. I take the question of what it is for 
two individuals to think of an object under the same MOP as equivalent to the question 
of what it is for two individuals to possess the same singular concept. I shall sometimes 
use ‘concept’ in this way. 
2 See for example Peacocke 1992. Traditional ‘descriptivist’ theories of MOPs count as 
versions of IRS, as do a variety of notions of ‘concept’ popular among cognitive scientists 
insofar as concepts, thus construed, are claimed to be the constituents of thoughts. 
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to be accounted for in terms of epistemic differences of the kind to which 
IRS theories appeal. As I shall explain, however, they do take into account 
certain epistemic relations between tokens in determining which tokens 
are of the same MOP.3 Popular versions of atomism include the Language 
of Thought (LOT) hypothesis (Fodor 1975, 1998, 2008), all versions of the 
Mental Files framework (Perry 1980; Recanati 1993, 2012, 2016), and a 
variety of other theories that individuate MOPs in terms of relations 
between tokens (for example Kaplan 1990; Schroeter 2012; Schroeter and 
Schroeter 2014, 2016; Sainsbury and Tye 2012. Richard Heck Jr. (2012) also 
leans toward a ‘no content’ view of this general kind, at least with respect 
to the standard Frege cases.) Some of these theories can also be construed 
as LOT or mental file theories. 
In this paper I shall concentrate on atomistic views, which are generally 
held to face a greater difficulty than IRS theories in accounting for shared 
MOPs. I shall put forward a simple view of what it takes for an atomistic 
MOP to be shared. This will be compatible with at least the spirit of most 
existing atomistic theories, though there may be some differences 
concerning details.4 In brief, I suggest that sharing a MOP consists in the 
existence of a transparent epistemic relation between the token thoughts 
of two speakers, such that communication between them trades on the 
identity of reference between their token singular terms (or mutatis 
mutandis for natural kind terms). The broad idea of individuating MOPs 
in terms of relations of transparency is not entirely new; what I hope to 
add here is some detail concerning the manner in which this comes about. 
First, however, I shall very briefly discuss IRS theories in order to put the 
problem facing atomistic theories in context. 
Given a version of IRS it is easy to see what it takes for a MOP to be 
shared: persons S1 and S2 think of an object under the same MOP if, and 
only if, the inferential role of the MOP under which S1 thinks of the object 
                                               
3 The distinction between atomistic and IRS models is similar to the distinction made by 
Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter (2016) between binding and matching models 
(respectively); at any rate, the kind of view that I shall discuss counts as both atomistic 
and binding. Another closely related distinction is between theories that see a difference 
in MOPs in terms of a difference in content (which is generally true of IRS theories) and 
those that do not (which is true of atomism). See Heck 2012 for a recent development of a 
‘no content’ approach; though Heck says very little there about interpersonal cases. 
4 Of the existing views, the view developed by Laura Schroeter both individually (e.g. 
2012) and in joint work with François Schroeter (2014, 2016) is the most similar to the view 
that I shall defend. I discuss some differences below. Some other theories are also similar 
but say little or nothing about what it is for a MOP to be shared. 
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is the same as the inferential role of the MOP under which S2 thinks of the 
object. Thus, for example, a descriptivist will say that S1 and S2 both think 
of Hesperus under the same MOP if and only if they both think of it as 
satisfying the same definite description, such as ‘the evening star’. A 
shared MOP is thus seen as a coincidence of individual achievements. 
Whether a given individual thinks of an object under a given MOP does 
not in general depend on how anyone else thinks of it. 
Given the individualistic nature of IRS-individuated MOPs, it is not 
surprising that epistemological concerns arise in relation to 
communication for such theories. It is not typically practical to determine 
the precise inferential role of another person’s thoughts. Consequently, if 
IRS is correct, then one is rarely in a position to know whether or not one 
is thinking of an object under the same MOP as someone else. It is not 
surprising, then, that advocates of such theories have often denied Frege’s 
(1956) view that communication consists in the sharing of thoughts (where 
‘thoughts’ are individuated in a fine-grained manner, by MOPs). 
Notoriously even Frege is often interpreted as having been willing to 
loosen the restriction in practice: 
 
In the case of an actual proper name such as ‘Aristotle’ opinions as to the sense 
may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the pupil of 
Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach 
another sense to the sentence ‘Aristotle was born in Stagira’ than will someone 
who takes as the sense of the name: the teacher of Alexander the Great who 
was born in Stagira. So long as the Bedeutung remains the same, such variations 
of sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical 
structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect 
language (1892/1966, footnote 2). 
 
Many others have followed Frege, thus interpreted, in thinking that 
successful communication requires only co-reference.5 I think that serious 
                                               
5 See for example Evans 1982: 399-400 and Dummett 1981: 102-3. There are countless other 
examples. For dissent from this interpretation of the above passage, however, see May 
2006. Richard Heck Jr. (1995, 2002) has put forward an in-between view according to 
which sameness of reference is necessary but not sufficient for communication; 
communication does not require sameness of MOP but does require that different 
speakers’ MOPs are appropriately related (where the latter condition is taken to be 
required in order for communication to allow the transmission of knowledge). See Dickie 
and Rattan 2010 for objections to Heck’s positive view. In more recent work Heck (2012) 
argues strongly against the view that IRS-style MOPs are needed in order to deal with 
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concerns can be raised about whether this view provides an adequate 
account of the epistemic relations between two speakers in 
communication.6 My purpose here, however, is not to raise objections to 
IRS but to discuss the kind of positive view of shared MOPs that can be 
put forward by the atomist. 
Like IRS theories, most atomistic theories have taken as their starting 
point the synchronic, intrapersonal cases to which Frege drew attention. 
The standard Fregean criterion of difference for MOPs is well known: for 
any singular terms ‘a’ and ‘b’, if a rational subject can assent to ‘a is F’ while 
dissenting or withholding judgment from ‘b is F’, then ‘a’ and ‘b’ express 
different MOPs. This is true even if ‘a’ and ‘b’ share the same reference. 
Provided we restrict attention to the synchronic intrapersonal case, LOT 
accounts for the standard Frege cases in terms of the syntax of mental 
symbols. Syntax is whatever physical property the cognitive system is 
sensitive to when it sorts symbols by type. Fodor often uses shape as an 
example, though of course the relevant physical property in actual human 
beings is likely to be something other than shape. So, according to the LOT 
hypothesis, if a rational subject assents to ‘a is F’ while dissenting from ‘b 
is F’, this is because the LOT symbols corresponding to ‘a’ and ‘b’ differ in 
syntax.7 
                                               
Frege cases, though he leaves it open whether there might be other reasons to appeal to 
such MOPs. But he says little about interpersonal (or diachronic) sameness of MOPs; 
though he argues (correctly, I think) that shared MOPs are not needed in order for there 
to be psychological laws that generalise across individuals (2012: 164-5). This does not, of 
course, show that there are no other reasons to appeal to shared atomistic MOPs. 
6  See for example Heck’s (1995, 2002) argument that the view of communication as 
requiring only co-reference assumes that communication consists in the transmission of 
information whereas, Heck argues, communication is also a means for the transmission 
of knowledge; and this places greater constraints on the relations between different 
speakers’ thoughts. I think Heck is right about this. See also Schroeter 2012 for a further 
objection with which I have much sympathy, concerning the need to allow that different 
individuals may think of an object under the same MOP despite substantial differences 
in their beliefs about the object. I see this as the interpersonal analogue of an argument 
that says that a subject’s opinions about an object may change in almost unlimited ways 
over time while the subject continues to think of the object under the same MOP. 
7  Note, however, that the explanation given above is mechanical rather than 
psychological; it does not really explain the matter in terms of intentionality, as Fodor 
(1994: chapter 1) acknowledges (see also Heck 2012: 151-2 for illuminating discussion of 
this). Below I suggest that, in any case, syntax is not the right way to individuate MOPs, 
even in the intrapersonal case. 
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The mental files framework accounts for such cases in terms of the 
difference between distinct files of information in the subject’s cognitive 
system. The general idea is that when one thinks of an object (of any kind) 
one has a mental ‘file’ of information concerning that object, and the 
mental file itself constitutes the MOP. One may possess more than one 
mental file concerning the same individual, and thus more than one MOP 
of the same individual. The different files normally contain different 
information, but the information in the file plays no part in the 
individuation of the MOP. The mere difference in numerical identity 
between the files themselves constitutes the difference between the MOPs. 
Thus when someone believes that a is F, but does not believe that b is F, it 
is because the predicate ‘is F’ is contained in the ‘a’ file but is not contained 
in the ‘b’ file. Even where there is co-reference, predicates are not 
transferred from one file to another unless the subject explicitly accepts co-
reference, typically through an identity belief ‘a = b’. MOPs thus construed 
are non-descriptive; they are quite unlike the traditional notion of a MOP. 
For atomistic theories, however, the question of what would constitute 
two subjects sharing the same MOP (that is, thinking of an object under 
the same MOP) has often been found more problematic than it is for IRS 
theories. The standard Fregean criterion only tells us when two MOPs are 
different, and only does that in the synchronic intrapersonal case. 
Moreover, the notions that atomists have used to explain sameness and 
difference of MOP in the intrapersonal case often have no obvious 
application in the interpersonal case. For example, LOT symbols are 
standardly typed by syntax within an individual. But there is no reason to 
expect that the physical properties that constitute the syntax of a symbol 
will ever be duplicated between one individual and another. To keep 
things simple, let us suppose that there were a LOT, and that in humans 
the syntax of the LOT symbols were literally just a matter of shape. 
Suppose that my ‘Hesperus’ symbols were circular and my ‘Phosphorus’ 
symbols were triangular. There does not seem any good reason to suppose 
that the shapes of your ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ symbols should 
match up with mine. Perhaps the shapes of your symbols map on to words 
in different ways to mine, or perhaps your symbols are all different shapes 
than any of mine. If we were to identify MOPs with syntactic shapes then 
we should quite likely have to say that MOPs would be shared only very 
rarely. 
MOPs should not be identified with syntactic properties, however. 
Syntactic properties belong to the wrong descriptive level to be MOPs. 
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They help explain the mechanism by which token symbols are treated as 
belonging to different types within an individual, but they are invisible 
from the point of view of person-level psychology. It is the latter that 
MOPs were introduced to explain. This is made vivid when we consider 
that it seems plausible that there could be a computational system whose 
symbols gradually changed shape over time, but whose symbol-reading 
dispositions also changed in a precisely corresponding manner, such that 
all of the computational properties of the system remained constant. If this 
happened in a mind the subject need not even be aware of the change, and 
we should not be inclined to say that the subject’s mind contained 
constantly changing MOPs. This reflects the fact that the LOT notion of a 
symbol is ultimately a functional, not physical, one. 
Much the same applies to the mental files framework, or any other 
atomistic theory. It is the inferential distinctness of the files – the fact that 
predicates in one file are kept separate from those in another – that 
constitutes the difference in MOPs. The details of physical implementation 
are irrelevant to this. Consequently for both LOT and the mental files 
framework, and for any other atomistic view, it might appear that there is 
simply no fact of the matter about whether two subjects think of an object 
under the same MOP. Fodor has sometimes acknowledged something of 
this sort: 
 
What, if anything, makes A’s thought that Cicero is wet type identical to B’s 
thought that Cicero is wet rather than to B’s thought that Tully is wet. (It clearly 
can’t be the spelling, assuming the thoughts are in Mentalese.) […] It’s 
probably possible to construct cases in which any Direct Reference theorist 
(not just any Informational Atomist) has to say that there’s no question of truth 
as to which of two necessarily coextensive, syntactically primitive names are 




Although Frege appears to have made a concession in the footnote quoted 
above, in some of his other writings he was very clear that communication 
required sameness of MOP (and thus sameness of thought, given a fine-
grained individuation of thoughts at the level of MOPs). For example, both 
Frege’s Logic (1997), which is thought to have been written in 1897, and 
‘The Thought’ (1956), which was first published in 1918, contain 
arguments such as the following (from Logic), in which Frege represents 
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disagreement as the interpersonal equivalent of explicit intrapersonal 
contradiction: 
 
A thought does not belong specially to the person who thinks it, as does an 
idea to the person who has it: everyone who grasps it encounters it in the same 
way, as the same thought. Otherwise two people would never attach the same 
thought to the same sentence, but each would have his own thought; and if, 
say, one person put 2 × 2 = 4 forward as true whilst another denied it, there 
would be no contradiction, because what was asserted by one would be quite 
different from what was rejected by the other. It would be quite impossible for 
the assertions of different people to contradict one another, for a contradiction 
occurs only when it is the very same thought that one person is asserting to be 
true and another to be false. So a dispute about something would be futile. 
There would simply be no common ground to fight on; each thought would 
be enclosed in its own private world and a contradiction between the thoughts 
of different people would be like a war between ourselves and the inhabitants 
of Mars. (1997: 235.)8 
 
Frege scholarship is not my chief concern here, and I do not want to 
suggest that any of the existing atomistic accounts of MOPs are what Frege 
had in mind. But I do feel that in the above passage Frege hints at an 
important idea, that a satisfactory account of MOPs should involve a mesh 
between the metaphysics and epistemology of MOPs such that when two 
speakers think of an object under the same MOP it follows that there is a 
kind of direct epistemological engagement between them concerning that 





The purpose of individuating MOPs, I assume, is to individuate thoughts 
(of which MOPs are constituents) in such a way as to correctly describe the 
cognitive life of a rational thinker. One part of this involves explaining why 
a rational thinker can fail to know ‘a = b’ a priori and can simultaneously 
take differing attitudes to ‘a is F’ and ‘b is F’ even when ‘a’ and ‘b’ co-refer. 
The standard criterion of difference for MOPs covers such cases. But this 
is not the whole story about the individuation of thoughts. There can also 
                                               
8 In interpreting the final sentence of this passage one must of course keep in mind that 
Frege was writing at a time when space travel seemed almost inconceivable. 
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be rational connections between a single subject’s token thoughts at 
different times and, I shall suggest, similar rational connections between 
the token thoughts of different subjects at the same time. These are not 
covered by the standard criterion. One could stubbornly insist that MOPs 
were introduced only to deal with Frege cases; but a theory that dealt with 
Frege cases and also dealt with diachronic intrapersonal and synchronic 
interpersonal cases would obviously be a better theory. 
It has been suggested, I think very plausibly, that an individuation of 
MOPs should reflect a certain kind of epistemic relation that exists among 
certain sets of token thoughts. This can be brought out in terms of the 
inferences that can be made validly by a rational subject.9 Consider for 
example the following two inferences: 
 
Inf1      Inf2 
(P1) Hesperus is bright  (P1) Hesperus is bright  
(P2) Hesperus is a planet  (P2) Phosphorus is a planet 
------------    ------------ 
(C) There is a bright planet  (C) There is a bright planet 
 
Clearly Inf1 is a formally valid inference, and as such it can also be 
construed as a sequence of thoughts that can occur in the mind of a 
perfectly rational subject. Inf2, however, is not formally valid, even if 
Hesperus is Phosphorus. It does not correspond to a rational sequence of 
thoughts. If, however, we added the premise ‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ to 
Inf2, it would be valid. Assuming that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ co-
refer, the difference in validity between Inf1 and Inf2 is constituted by the 
fact that the two tokens of ‘Hesperus’ in Inf1 have the same MOP whereas 
the token of ‘Hesperus’ in Inf2 has a different MOP from the token of 
‘Phosphorus’. 
I trust that this is all very familiar. Now consider a slight variation on 
the theme. Consider again someone making an inference like Inf1. 
Suppose that upon entertaining the second premise a doubt arose in the 
subject’s mind as to whether the first uttered token of ‘Hesperus’ referred 
to what the subject would now call ‘Hesperus’. No premise equivalent to 
‘Hesperus is Phosphorus’ would be available, because the first token of 
                                               
9 The following argument draws heavily on Campbell 1987, 1994: 73-88. Some hints at a 
similar kind of argument can be found in Evans 1981: 309. Many others have subsequently 
taken the same view; see for example Recanati 2012: 47-50. 
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‘Hesperus’ occurred at an earlier time and would no longer be available to 
thought. Instead an interpretive premise would be needed10: 
 
Inf3       
(P1) Hesperus is bright 
(P2) The token of ‘Hesperus’ in (P1) stands for Hesperus, therefore: 
(P3) Hesperus is bright 
(P4) Hesperus is a planet 
------------ 
(C) There is a bright planet 
 
Adding premise P2 would only help if no further questions arose 
regarding the co-reference of the tokens of ‘Hesperus’ in P2, P3 and P4. In 
any case, it is clear that under normal circumstances there is no need for 
supplementation by interpretive premises such as P2. Instead, to borrow 
John Campbell’s (1987, 1994) apt phrase, an inference like Inf1 trades on the 
identity of reference of the different tokens of ‘Hesperus’. According to 
Campbell, the ability to trade on identity in this way is precisely what we 
aim to capture by saying that the different tokens of ‘Hesperus’ in Inf1 
share the same MOP. When both tokens share the same MOP there is no 
epistemic gap between the tokens of the kind that would need bridging by 
an interpretive premise. Similarly, if Inf3 requires the interpretive premise 
P2 in order to be valid, the token of ‘Hesperus’ in P1 does not share the 
same MOP as the subsequent tokens of ‘Hesperus’. The standard Frege 
cases can be thought of as particular instances of this more general 
principle. For example, the subject who simultaneously takes differing 
attitudes to ‘a is F’ and ‘b is F’ is able to do so without irrationality because 
of the epistemic gap between the token of ‘a’ and the token of ‘b’; there is 
no ability to trade on the co-reference of ‘a’ and ‘b’. Conversely a subject 
who cannot rationally take conflicting attitudes to the two thoughts, and 
who therefore goes directly from believing ‘a is F’ to believing ‘b is F’, is in 
the same situation as someone who infers ‘a is F’ from ‘a is F’ (an inference 
of the form ‘p therefore p’). A rational subject cannot reject the inference, 
and is thus trading on the co-reference of the two tokens, which share the 
                                               
10 Alternatively one could add a premise to the effect that the tokens of ‘Hesperus’ in P1 
and P2 co-referred. The reason for focusing on the kind of interpretive premise given in 
the main text will become apparent when we come to the interpersonal case. But the 
important point is that normally no interpretive premise, of any kind, is needed. 
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same MOP. I shall therefore take the ability to trade on identity as both 
necessary and sufficient for sameness of MOP. 
I hope that nothing thus far is very controversial; other atomists have 
made similar claims. We now have another way to think of the distinction 
between atomist and IRS theories. The atomist holds that, alongside 
reference, the kinds of inferential relations among tokens just described 
are fully individuative of MOPs; whereas the IRS theorist, while agreeing 
that MOP tokens must indeed stand in such relations, holds that MOPs 
require individuation in terms of further epistemic properties common to 
all (and only) tokens of the same MOP. 
Having got this far, it is not a very big step to understand, at least in 
very broad terms, what it would be for two people to think of an object 
under the same atomistic MOP. I shall distinguish two kinds of 
communication that I call interpretive and transparent communication. 
Interpretive communication rests on interpretive premises in a way that is 
analogous to inference Inf3. Like Inf3, interpretive communication does 
not involve shared MOPs. It is the kind of non-Fregean communication 
that depends only on co-reference (and an assumption of co-reference by 
the speakers). Transparent communication, on the other hand, involves 
trading on identity and requires no interpretive premises. Transparent 
communication is analogous to Inf1 and involves shared MOPs. I shall 




                                               
11 Dickie and Rattan’s (2010) ‘Equivalence Class Fregeanism’ strikes me as compatible 
with the broad story thus far – they agree that shared MOPs require a similar kind of 
epistemic transparency between speakers. They do not give many further details of how 
the transparency comes about, however, and nothing comparable to what is suggested 
below. Sainsbury and Tye’s (2012) ‘originalism’ about concepts, however, is not 
compatible with this kind of story. Although I agree with many elements of their account, 
including the general claim that concepts are non-eternal abstract continuants, Sainsbury 
and Tye are committed to the claim that ‘necessarily, concept C1 = concept C2 iff the 
originating use of C1 = the originating use of C2’ (2012: 44). Since sameness of originating 
use is neither necessary nor sufficient for a relation of epistemic transparency between 
tokens (especially if the tokens occur in the minds of different subjects), the originalist 
account will differ significantly from mine concerning which cases count as shared 
concepts. It strikes me as a failing of the originalist account that it thus loosens the 
connection between the individuation of concepts and the epistemic relations between 




Suppose Jones and Brown each refer to the same person when they say 
‘Smith’. Jones says to Brown: ‘Smith is tall’. There are two ways in which 
Brown might understand what Jones is saying. The first way is interpretive. 
Brown treats Jones’s language as an idiolect, distinct from Brown’s own 
language, and therefore relies on an interpretive hypothesis such as the 
following (in which the subscript ‘J’ denotes Jones’s utterance of ‘Smith’): 
 
(1) ‘SmithJ’ stands for Smith 
 
Although we are considering a case in which both speakers can refer to the 
same individual by saying ‘Smith’, it would make little difference to their 
communication if they had different names for that same individual, or 
spoke entirely different languages. Interpretive hypotheses such as (1) 
would still facilitate a form of communication in much the same way. 
In this way, if Brown believes that whatever Jones says is true, Brown 
will come to believe that Smith is tall. Note that the grounds for Brown’s 
belief would be undermined if Brown had reason to doubt the interpretive 
hypothesis (1). In the circumstances envisaged Brown could always 
coherently wonder whether ‘SmithJ’ stands for Smith. If (1) were indeed 
false, Brown’s belief that Smith is tall would be susceptible to a form of 
error that I shall call error through misinterpretation.12 It could turn out that 
Smith was in fact tall, but if that were the case then Brown’s acquisition of 
a true belief would be just a matter of luck. 
Since Brown requires the interpretive hypothesis (1) in order to reach 
the conclusion that Smith is tall, Brown does not trade on the identity of 
reference between Jones and Brown’s tokens of ‘Smith’. The interpretive 
hypothesis is needed in order to bridge the epistemic gap between the two 
speakers’ thoughts. Consequently, by parity with the intrapersonal case, I 
suggest that we should regard this as a case in which Jones and Brown 
think of Smith under different MOPs. 
I do not think that all communication is interpretive, however, nor even 
that this is very commonly the case. Consider a slightly different example, 
involving a natural kind term. Jones says to Brown: 
                                               
12 In using this phrase I intend to draw a loose parallel with error through misidentification, 
and with immunity to error through misidentification (IEM) for the case of transparent 
communication described below. On the phenomenon of IEM see Shoemaker 1968, and 
for more recent discussion see the papers collected in Prosser and Recanati 2012. 
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(2) Beech trees are tall 
 
Suppose further that, like Putnam (1975), Brown cannot distinguish elms 
from beeches. Jones, however, is an ‘expert’, someone who can distinguish 
beeches from other species, and Brown knows this. This is, then, a classic 
example of linguistic deference. Something very similar can occur with 
names; I use a natural kind term for the example only because of its 
familiarity. 
In this situation Brown may of course speculate about the reference of 
‘beech’. If Brown can make an independent identification of some species 
of tree, T, then Brown can speculate as to whether a beech is a T. But in 
deferring to Jones concerning the reference of ‘beech’, Brown does not give 
an interpretation to Jones’s token of ‘beech’. Instead, co-reference is 
automatic; ‘beech’, as uttered by Brown, refers to whatever it refers to 
when used by any other member of the linguistic community.13 Under 
those circumstances Brown’s belief is immune to error through 
misinterpretation. Brown cannot coherently wonder whether ‘beechJ’ 
refers to beeches, because Brown has no independent grasp of what a 
beech is (that is, no independent grasp of what Brown calls a ‘beech’). So 
Brown cannot misinterpret Jones. Instead, Brown trades on the identity of 
reference between Jones’s tokens of ‘beech’ and Brown’s tokens of ‘beech’. 
So when Brown comes to believe that beech trees are tall through accepting 
Jones’s utterance of (2) there is no epistemic gap between the thoughts of 
the two speakers of the kind that would need to be closed by an 
interpretive premise. Instead, in such cases, Brown’s understanding of 
Jones is transparent – it involves no interpretive premise. I suggest that in 
cases of transparent communication, where the speakers trade on identity 
rather than relying on interpretive premises, the speakers think of the 
reference under the same MOP. But this claim cannot be made fully clear 
until a little more has been said about deference and shared words. 
 
 
                                               
13 I am not, however, suggesting that Brown’s MOP is characterised by a description such 
as ‘the kind referred to by Jones and others as “beech”’. Brown merely thinks of certain 
trees as beeches while accepting a kind of implicit commitment to a communal word-
using practice; the reference of ‘beech’ is then determined by the best interpretation of the 
set of epistemically connected tokens of ‘beech’ across the community of users of that 




Deference is often described as an asymmetric relation holding between 
experts, who can identify the reference, and consumers, who cannot. But 
this is not the whole story. The standard examples of deference are special 
cases of a more general phenomenon identified by semantic externalists 
such as Putnam (1975) and Burge (1979), wherein individuals do not 
independently determine the references of their words. It is not generally 
the case that anyone is infallible in the use of a word. Even experts can 
make mistakes or be forgetful. If a ‘pure consumer’ is someone who cannot 
independently rule out any object as a candidate for the reference of a 
word, then an expert cannot be corrected by a pure consumer. But an 
expert can potentially be corrected by anyone who is not a pure consumer 
– other experts, or even those who have only partial knowledge of the 
reference. For example, there may be a consumer whose only knowledge 
about beeches is that beeches are deciduous trees. But when a person who 
would normally be considered an expert, but who is suffering a short-lived 
confusion, points at an evergreen tree and says ‘that is a beech’, the 
consumer, recognising that the demonstrated tree is evergreen, might 
correct the expert. A rational language user, no matter how expert, should 
always be open to this kind of correction. 
There may be further reasons for complicating the simple distinction 
between pure experts and pure consumers. For example it is not clear that 
determinate reference is possible only if there is at least one pure expert, 
who can identify the reference without help from others. Think of a very 
complex entity such as a large commercial computer program. Such a 
program would typically be written by a large team, with each 
programmer responsible for a different part of the program. We can 
imagine a scenario in which no complete stored record of the program 
existed (perhaps the records were all destroyed in an accident). If a 
question arose as to which computers were running the program in 
question, there might be no individual capable of giving a definite answer. 
Yet the group of programmers as a whole might be able to do so by virtue 
of the expertise distributed among them. 
Deference is a manifestation of a deeper phenomenon: the phenomenon 
of shared languages, containing shared words. Words are public objects, 
with references that are determined collectively by the speakers of the 
language. When different speakers utter tokens of the same word then the 
fact that their tokens co-refer is not the result of a coincidence of individual 
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achievements. It is not that each speaker individually determines the 
reference of their own tokens, while aiming to match their own idiolectic 
references with the references of the tokens produced by others. I cannot 
make my tokens of the word ‘London’ refer to Paris. I can introduce a new 
word that refers to Paris, and spell it ‘London’, but in doing so I will not 
have made a token of the English word ‘London’ refer to anything other 
than London (I am assuming, with David Kaplan (1990) and others, that 
there can be more than one word with the same spelling and pronunciation, 
due to the different origins of the words). Instead, when a word is shared, 
and it is correctly recognised, questions about co-reference do not, and 
cannot, arise. A shared word involves a kind of common commitment that 
locks together the reference of each token. The fact that different speakers 
recognise the words of others as tokens of their own words is already 
sufficient to bring about this locking of reference. (This is not to say that 
one acquires explicit beliefs about which word is uttered; when Jones says 
‘beech trees are tall’, Brown simply hears (what Brown would express in 
Brown’s own words as) ‘beech trees are tall’.) To borrow a phrase 
commonly used in discussions of co-reference in the intrapersonal case, 
the co-reference of tokens of shared words is de jure, not merely de facto. 
This de jure locking of reference comes about precisely because different 
speakers trade on the identity of reference between tokens produced by 
different speakers. Deference is a special case of this; the non-expert 
speaker can lock reference to the tokens produced by the community as a 
whole, including the experts, just by recognising a shared public word. 
Maintaining the reference of a shared word is thus a collective enterprise. 
There is of course no guarantee that there will never be disagreements 
among experts. It could turn out that there was no consensus concerning 
the reference of a word. In that case, however, we should say that the word 
lacked a determinate reference; we should not say that some experts used 
the word to refer to one object while others used it to refer to another. It 
could have been the case that two groups of people used a typographically 
identical word to refer to different objects, but not while those two groups 
recognised each other as speakers of the same word. 
Suppose Jones and Brown were in conversation, and Jones said ‘London 
is a big city’. Brown might have entertained doubts as to whether Jones 
was speaking English. But suppose that this was not the case. Brown could 
not then coherently make the following supposition: 
 
(3) Jones’s token of ‘London’ does not refer to London 
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The situation is like that of (2); Brown could only accept (3) by rejecting the 
assumption that Jones had uttered a token of the English word ‘London’. 
Consequently, as soon as Brown recognised that a token of a specific word 
in Brown’s own vocabulary had been uttered, questions of interpretation 
could not then arise. Error through misinterpretation would be ruled out. 
Instead, if Brown accepted what Jones said, Brown would come to share 
Jones’s belief that London is a big city directly, by trading on the identity 
of reference between Jones’s and Brown’s tokens of ‘London’. Their 
communication would be transparent, and both would think of London 
under the same MOP. 
I have stressed the preceding points because it is not uncommon for 
philosophers to assume that to trade on identity is to implicitly presuppose 
a common reference between tokens, such that this presupposition could 
turn out to be false.14 I do not think this is quite right. This way of putting 
things conjures up a picture wherein the references of different tokens are 
determined independently, and merely presupposed to be the same. I 
reject this picture, for I do not think that the difference between an explicit 
assumption of co-reference and an implicit presupposition of co-reference 
would be enough to account for the sharp epistemological difference 
between cases of different MOPs and cases of shared MOPs (such as the 
difference between Inf1 and Inf2), or the difference between de facto and de 
jure co-reference. It is hard to see why the difference between an 
assumption occurring explicitly or implicitly would constitute that kind of 
epistemic difference. So I shall take a strong line here: I hold that trading on 
identity (and thus sharing MOPs between tokens) does not rest on a fallible 
presupposition of co-reference between tokens of the same word. The phrase ‘rest 
on’ is intended to convey the idea that if co-reference fails, which it might 
in some cases, it is always because some other presupposition, concerning 
something other than co-reference, fails. Consequently in such cases it is 
the latter presupposition that makes the difference; a presupposition of co-
                                               
14 I use the word ‘presupposition’ here in its ordinary sense, meaning an assumption that 
is made by a subject unconsciously or implicitly, but whose known falsehood would 
undermine the justification for the subject’s belief. Laura Schroeter (2012) uses the word 
‘presumption’ for much the same thing, while Burge (1998) says ‘tacit presupposition’. 
There is a related but more technical use of ‘presupposition’ in linguistics and philosophy 
of language, where a presupposition is a property of a linguistic utterance; I do not intend 
the word in this more technical sense. 
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reference would, by itself, be idle and could not make any difference 
regarding the individuation of MOPs. 
A number of putative counterexamples may seem pressing. In each case, 
however, I shall argue that insofar as the epistemic transparency between 
the tokens rests on a fallible presupposition, it is not a presupposition of 
co-reference. Only the first of the following cases is interpersonal, but since 
I have argued that we should treat the interpersonal case as an analogue 
of the intrapersonal cases, the same principles had better apply in all cases: 
 
Case 1: Jones and Brown refer to different people when they say ‘Smith’. Clearly 
this can happen. But, as stressed above, we should regard these as cases in 
which Jones and Brown each utter a token of a different name. So there is 
indeed a presupposition that could in principle fail, even when Jones and 
Brown share a MOP; but this is a presupposition, implicitly made by 
Brown, that Jones has uttered a token of the name ‘Smith’ (i.e. the same 
name that Brown would utter). It is not a presupposition that Jones and 
Brown’s tokens of the same name ‘Smith’ share the same reference. 
 
Case 2: Failure to keep track perceptually. I shall discuss demonstratives in 
more detail below. But I do hold that a subject who keeps track of a visually 
perceived object, and who first thinks ‘that is F’, then thinks, a short time 
later, ‘that is G’, where ‘is F’ and ‘is G’ are predicates whose applicability 
cannot change over time, can then validly infer ‘that is both F and G’ by 
trading on the identity of reference between the tokens of ‘that’, and thus 
thinking of the object under the same MOP throughout. Given that the 
object might be switched for a doppelganger without the subject noticing, 
however, it might appear that the later tokens would then refer to a 
different object, thus rendering the inference invalid. I agree with Burge 
(e.g. 1998) and others, however, that in such cases the different tokens of 
‘that’ may be linked in a quasi-anaphoric manner, such that their 
references cannot come apart. In a switching case of this kind, the reference 
of the tokens of ‘that’ becomes indeterminate, much as would happen if 
the later tokens of ‘that’ were replaced by ‘it’ (‘that is F… and it is also G… 
etc.’). So the fallible presupposition required for valid inference in such 
cases is that the object has not switched; it is not a presupposition about 
the references of the tokens. 
 
Case 3. Burge’s (1988) ‘slow switching’ case. If you learned words like ‘water’ 
and ‘Smith’ on Twin Earth many years ago but were then unknowingly 
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transported to Earth several years ago, it is not plausible that the references 
of your tokens remain indeterminate now. There was a period of 
indeterminacy when you first changed planet; but by now, your words 
normally refer to kinds and individuals here on Earth. But what happens 
when your memories, dating from Twin Earth, interact with your current 
thoughts? You remember that Smith used to hate swimming in water as a 
child, but you know that Smith now loves the water. Burge holds that since 
your first belief about Smith was formed on Twin Earth, your belief that 
Smith hated the water refers to the Twin Earth version of Smith, and of 
water (i.e. XYZ). Burge argues that contextual factors determine that 
within a given train of thought the reference stays constant. When you 
reason that ‘Smith once hated the water, but Smith now loves the water, 
so Smith has changed’ your tokens of ‘Smith’ and ‘water’ have their Twin-
Earthly references throughout; but in other contexts they have their 
Earthly references. 
Laura Schroeter (2007) argues, to my mind convincingly, that Burge 
cannot be right about this; if a memory of the very same event could shift 
reference with context in the way that Burge suggests, too many 
unpalatable consequences would follow. Instead, she argues that words 
used to state memories derived from Twin Earth would have their Twin 
Earthly references, which would remain stable; yet the same words, used 
to state recently-formed beliefs about Smith and water, would have their 
Earthly references. Consequently when one makes an inference such as the 
one described above there is a risk of equivocation, and one must 
presuppose, fallibly, that the tokens of the same words co-refer. 
Schroeter’s overall view about the individuation of MOPs, which she 
shares with François Schroeter, is similar to mine in many ways.15 But on 
the issue of whether co-reference has to be presupposed, if I understand 
Schroeter correctly, then I disagree. The issue is subtle, however; I do agree 
with Schroeter that the appearance of de jure co-reference does not 
guarantee co-reference in all cases; but in my view, that’s because other 
presuppositions, not about co-reference, can be false. I do not think that 
any plausible options of this kind are open to Schroeter, given what she 
                                               
15 See Schroeter 2012 for a summary of the ‘connectedness’ model, and also Schroeter and 
Schroeter 2014, 2016. They give less detail about the interpersonal case than I am giving, 
but when Laura Schroeter (2012: 182) says ‘the default interpretation generated by 
automatic linguistic parsing is to simply take others’ words at face value—as samesaying 
de jure with your own use of those words’ I take it she has in mind something similar to 
what I am describing as interpersonal trading on identity. 
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says in response to Burge.16 
Despite Burge and Schroeter’s intuitions to the contrary, I think the 
natural and intuitive way to treat the slow-switching case is to hold that 
after a sufficient period on Earth, all of the tokens have their current 
Earthly references. Right now, in the actual world, let’s suppose, I believe 
that as a child I swam in water (i.e. H2O), that I married Smith (the 
Earthling), and so on. If I were to discover that in fact I spent the early 
years of my life on Twin Earth, it would strike me that all of these things 
that I believe were strictly false. I did not in fact swim in water – I swam in 
some other stuff (XYZ), and I did not in fact marry Smith – I married 
someone else, who looks just the same. So what I believed was false. I did, 
of course, believe many other things that were true: I swam in a clear 
watery liquid, I married someone with certain characteristics, and so on. 
Perhaps I have also retained some imagistic content – sights, sounds and 
so on – that still have their original content. But if such contents are non-
conceptual, as many believe, then they need not affect the current 
references of my concepts. If these intuitions are correct, then Schroeter’s 
argument that co-reference is contingent in such cases doesn’t get off the 
ground. 
Note that the cases that Burge and Schroeter discuss concern synchronic 
relations between tokens; the time differences in such cases concern the 
sources of the beliefs. But there can also be transparent synchronic 
relations between tokens; one trades on identity every time one believes ‘a 
if F’ at time t1 and retains a belief ‘a if F’ at time t2 without the need for an 
interpretive premise. But these relations do not hold over extended 
intervals of time without intermediary stages; there are no direct relations 
of this kind between Twin Earth and much later Earth tokens. Over small 
enough intervals there is no determinate shift in reference between tokens, 
given that the intervals can be arbitrarily small. 
 
Case 4. Cross-modal inferences (cf. Campbell 1987). I both see and touch an 
object, I thereby come to believe ‘that is red’ and ‘that is warm’ and I infer 
‘that is both red and warm’. This can be treated in the same way as case 2: 
when I trade on identity I lock the references of the tokens together, so 
there is no fallible presupposition of co-reference. But I do presuppose that 
                                               
16 Perhaps it could be claimed that the inference rests on a fallible presupposition about 
not having changed planets between the events described by the different tokens. In any 
case, if my own view of the case, described below, is correct, then no such presupposition 
is needed. 
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the object that I am seeing is the same one that I am touching. If it is not, 
then the reference of my tokens of ‘that’ is indeterminate. I could, of course, 
refer to the seen object and to the felt object independently, such that I 
could then make sense of the claim ‘that (seen) object is not that (felt) 
object’. But in doing so, I would think of the object under two different 
MOPs, both of which would be distinct from the MOP under which I think 
of the object when I trade on identity. A kind of commitment is involved 
when tokens are locked together in trading on identity, analogous to the 
case in which one defers, and thus joins a name-using practice, rather than 






So far we have only considered thoughts expressed using words whose 
reference does not vary with context. What about context dependent terms 
such as demonstratives and indexicals? Can the MOPs that they express 
be shared? If not, this would not in itself undermine what has been said 
thus far. Perhaps indexical communication is always interpretive, and only 
communication with context-independent language can involve shared 
MOPs. I shall argue, however, that MOPs can be shared in all cases. I shall 
start with ‘pure’ demonstratives, such as ‘that’. Suppose Jones sees an 
object moving around and says, to Brown: 
 
(4) That is a wasp 
 
Typically Brown will identify some particular object as the best candidate 
to be the reference of Jones’s use of ‘that’. But Brown will be open to 
correction by Jones. There might be several wasps in the vicinity, and 
Brown may have picked the wrong one. So initially Brown defers to Jones 
with respect to the reference of ‘that’. But as the conversation continues, 
Jones might temporarily lose track of the wasp and instead defer to Brown, 
who has kept track of it (‘was it that one that we were talking about?’). 
Hence keeping track of the reference can be a team effort, just as it is with 
words like ‘beech’ whose reference is fixed. As with ‘beech’, the person 
who first introduces the word starts as an infallible expert, but is open to 
possible correction thereafter. Given that the references of their tokens of 
‘that’ are locked together, allowing them to trade on identity instead of 
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relying on interpretive hypotheses, Jones and Brown think of the object 
under the same MOP. 
There is an obvious complication for demonstratives, however, because 
the word ‘that’ may be used to refer to any number of different objects, 
even within a single sentence (‘that is a wasp, but that is a bee’), or to refer 
to the same object under different MOPs (‘that = that’ can be informative). 
This is not only a feature of demonstratives; ambiguous words such as 
‘bank’ are common within a single language, and give rise to similar 
problems. There are at least two possible ways to deal with such cases. 
First, along the lines suggested above for ambiguous cases, we could 
follow Kaplan (1990) in holding that numerically distinct words within a 
single language can be qualitative duplicates. Thus, instead of one 
ambiguous word ‘bank’ there are two different words that have identical 
pronunciation and spelling, and we use context to determine which word 
has been uttered. Similarly, one could hold that each new episode of 
demonstrative reference gives rise to a new word ‘that’, which continues 
to exist for the duration of the conversation. On this view the issues 
concerning deference and shared MOPs are no different for thoughts 
expressed using ‘that’ than they are for thoughts expressed using ‘beech’. 
Potential confusion about reference arises only if the audience has failed 
to correctly recognise which particular ‘that’ was uttered. 
I think we must, however, acknowledge that anyone who correctly 
understands the word ‘that’ must understand that it is not a name, but a 
multi-purpose word that can be used to refer to any number of different 
things in different contexts. Perhaps a better account would say instead 
that there are sets of tokens of ‘that’ which we group together according to 
contextual factors, and all members of the set are understood to be de jure 
co-referential. When we converse using ‘that’, I not only intend my tokens 
of ‘that’ to be referentially locked to yours, but I use contextual factors to 
signal this to you. Provided we recognise each other’s tokens of ‘that’ to 
belong to this set, the coordinating effects of a shared word are achieved; 
we can trade on identity of reference between tokens, and think of an 
object under the same MOP.17 
                                               
17 Strictly speaking one could give a corresponding account for non-demonstrative words 
such as names; instead of saying that there are two different words ‘Smith’, we could say 
that there are two different subsets of the tokens of ‘Smith’ that are gathered together 
according to the reference preserving commitments of the speakers. In the case of non-
demonstrative words, however, I am not certain that this would amount to anything more 
than a terminological variant of the account that I have proposed. 
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There are two prima facie obstacles if we wish to extend the account of 
shared MOPs to indexicals such as ‘here’, ‘now’ and ‘I’. These both relate 
to the fact that different speakers may stand in different relations to the 
reference, requiring them to use different indexical terms. For example, if 
Jones says ‘I once saw a reindeer standing here’, the nearest equivalent that 
Brown could say would be ‘you once saw a reindeer standing there’, 
assuming that Brown is not standing near to Jones. 
The first obstacle is the one to which John Perry (1977) has drawn 
attention. Different indexicals are associated with systematic differences in 
behaviour that require explanation in terms of differences in belief states. 
If I believe that there is danger here, and you believe that there is danger 
there, we behave differently even if my ‘here’ and your ‘there’ tokens refer 
to the same place. Similar cases are easily constructed with temporal or 
personal indexicals. We cannot just insist that you and I think of the place 
under the same MOP and consequently share the same thought, without 
offering an explanation of the difference in our behaviour. And it is hard 
to see how this behavioural difference could be explained except through 
some kind of psychological difference between us. 
Perry’s solution was to adopt a distinction similar to Kaplan’s (1989) 
distinction between content and character. Content is a function from 
possible worlds to extensions, whereas character is a function from 
contexts to contents. Perry and Kaplan both hold that each different 
indexical term has a different character, and it is character that determines 
the psychological roles of thoughts and is equated with the MOP. Thus 
when I believe ‘there is danger here’ and you believe ‘there is danger there’, 
and my ‘here’ and your ‘there’ tokens co-refer, we each believe the same 
content but we do so under different characters, and thus different MOPs. 
We thus differ in our belief states. 
In previous work (Prosser 2005) I have argued that this way of 
individuating beliefs fails to account for the sense in which a belief can be 
retained by an individual whose location in space or time changes and 
who therefore uses different indexical terms at different times. Kaplan 
(1989: 537-8) himself raised this problem under the heading ‘cognitive 
dynamics’; see also Evans 1981. Suppose that at t1 I stand at location L and 
think ‘a reindeer once stood here’. I move away, keeping track of L as I 
move, and at t2 I think ‘a reindeer once stood there’. If my belief states at t1 
and t2 are distinct, with no retained singular MOP, as the Kaplan-Perry 
view suggests, then there is no psychological explanation – no explanation 
at a ‘personal’ level – of the occurrence of the belief at t2. But this is 
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implausible; there seems to be an important sense in which a belief can be 
retained in such cases. Moreover if we apply the criterion for sameness of 
MOP in terms of trading on identity then I think of L under the same MOP 
throughout. For my belief at t2 clearly derives from my belief at t1, and does 
so transparently, without relying on an interpretive premise (nor an 
identity belief ‘here = there’. As Evans (1981) observes, no such identity is 
a possible object of thought, because no person can ever think of L 
simultaneously as both ‘here’ and ‘there’.) So there is a strong prima facie 
case for a retained MOP in such cases; yet this cannot be reconciled with 
the Kaplan-Perry view, which equates characters with MOPs. In fact this 
is not surprising, given that the Kaplan-Perry individuation of indexical 
MOPs is most naturally thought of as a version of IRS, as defined above.18 
There is, however, a very simple way to explain how there can be a 
retained singular MOP despite the differences in behaviour in such cases, 
and the same solution carries over to the synchronic interpersonal case. 
When one uses an indexical term correctly, one stands in a certain relation 
to the reference. For example when one refers to a place as ‘here’ one is at 
that location; for short, one could say that the place is hereabouts. When one 
refers to a time as ‘now’ one, or a temporal stage of oneself, is simultaneous 
with that time; for short, we say that the time is present.19 Similarly, when 
one refers to a person as ‘I’ one stands in a certain relation to that person. 
One such relation is identity. But one also stands in other relations to 
oneself, and the relation that seems relevant here is a certain kind of 
epistemic-behavioural relation. For example, the person that one refers to 
as ‘I’ is the person whose bodily states one feels, whose arm one can raise 
without this being a product of some other action, and so on. But I shall 
not dwell on the details; my aim here is just to indicate the shape of an 
account that would allow for shared indexical MOPs.20 
When one uses ‘here’ in referring to L one not only stands in the 
hereabouts relation to L; one also believes this to be the case. That is why 
one uses the word ‘here’ rather than ‘there’. We can therefore distinguish 
                                               
18 Note that the kind of character in question would be what Perry (1997) calls a doxastic 
character, rather than a linguistic character. If these are understood as primitive 
components of thoughts then the theory is a version of IRS because different doxastic 
characters will have different inferential roles. 
19 Those who accept an A-theory of time may prefer to regard presentness as a primitive 
property of a time rather than a relation between a person and a time. This is compatible 
with the general account given above. 
20 For more on these subject-environment relations and their significance for thoughts 
expressible using indexicals, see Prosser 2015. 
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two different beliefs associated with an utterance of ‘a reindeer once stood 
here’. First there is the stated belief, which is of the form ‘a reindeer once 
stood at L’. But there is also a manifested belief: the belief that one manifests 
by using one indexical term rather than another. So, for example, in using 
‘here’ when referring to L one manifests the fact that one believes ‘L is 
hereabouts’.21 When one moves relative to L and one refers to L as ‘there’, 
one retains the stated belief (‘a reindeer once stood at L’), but there is a 
change in the manifested belief; one now believes something of the form 
‘L is thereabouts’ (where ‘thereabouts’ refers to another relation between 
the subject and L, different from the ‘hereabouts’ relation). It is the 
difference in the manifested belief that explains the differences in 
behaviour associated with the difference between ‘here’ and ‘there’. 
Nevertheless one can trade on identity through the transition between 
‘here’ and ‘there’, and thus continue to think of L under the same MOP 
(and consequently the same fine-grained belief can be retained). The 
situation is much the same for temporal indexicals where, for example, a 
use of ‘now’ manifests the fact that one believes a certain time to be present. 
There do not appear to be any equivalent dynamic cases for ‘I’, but similar 
principles will apply in the interpersonal case for personal indexicals, as I 
explain below. 
We can extend just the same reasoning to the interpersonal case. When 
I refer to L as ‘here’ and you refer to L as ‘there’, it is because I believe ‘L is 
hereabouts’ whereas you believe ‘L is thereabouts’. But we both also 
believe something of the form ‘a reindeer once stood at L’. So there is a 
difference in belief that explains the difference in our behaviour; but, if the 
conditions for transparent communication are met, we can share the belief 
that ‘a reindeer once stood at L’, with each of us thinking of the place L 
under the same MOP. Similarly, when I say ‘a bear is about to attack me’ 
and you say ‘a bear is about to attack you’, we may share the belief that ‘a 
bear is about to attack S’ while differing in our relational beliefs about S. 
In most temporal cases both speakers will share the same temporal context; 
but when temporal contexts do differ between the speakers a precisely 
analogous account can be given. 
The second obstacle to the extension of the account of shared MOPs to 
the indexical case concerns the fact that speaker and hearer utter different 
                                               
21 The notion of a belief that is ‘manifested’ by the use of an indexical is clearly related to 
certain presuppositions (in the linguist’s sense of that word) associated with the utterance 
of an indexical. I prefer to put things in the way that I do because it is the beliefs, and not 
any linguistic properties per se, that explain the actions. 
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words if they are in different contexts. If I say ‘I’ and you say ‘you’ when 
both referring to S, there is no doubt that we use different words. This 
obstacle is easier to overcome than the first. The solution appeals to the 
fact that anyone who properly understands the use of an indexical term 
must understand the way in which its reference varies with context. 
Consequently, anyone who understands the word ‘here’, and encounters 
a token of it, must understand that the token has the same reference as a 
token of ‘there’ in an appropriately related context, and they can rely on 
this fact in trading on identity. Strictly speaking it is not shared words per 
se that facilitate interpersonal trading on identity; it is their coordinating 
role that matters. Provided speaker and audience both understand the way 
in which a word functions, be it indexical or otherwise, the coordinating 
role can be achieved. We can imagine a convention according to which if 
the first speaker says ‘Hesperus’ then the second speaker says ‘Phosphorus’ 
when speaking about the same object. Provided all speakers were aware 
of this convention it would still be possible to trade on the identity of 
reference between the different tokens, and MOPs could be shared. If this 
is not a problem in the Hesperus/Phosphorus case it should not be a 
problem when different speakers use different indexicals either. Provided 
the speakers understand how indexical reference depends on context, 





I shall finish by briefly addressing a possible objection. I have been 
discussing what it is for two people to think of an object under the same 
MOP. This way of putting things suggests that the MOP under which one 
speaker thinks of the object stands in the identity relation to the MOP 
under which the other speaker thinks of the object. However the identity 
relation is transitive; yet there are cases in which the relation ‘_ thinks of 
an object under the same MOP as _’ fails to be transitive. Suppose, for 
example, that persons A and B communicate transparently using the word 
‘beech’, as do persons B and C. It does not follow that A and C also 
communicate transparently using ‘beech’. Perhaps A, B and C each 
pronounce the word slightly differently, such that A and C do not 
recognise one another’s ‘beech’ tokens as tokens of the same word. A and 
C therefore communicate only interpretively using ‘beech’, even though 
the pairs A-B and B-C communicate transparently. It would seem to follow 
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that while A and B share a MOP, as do B and C, A and C do not. This 
cannot be correct if sharing a MOP literally involves identity of MOPs. 
There is much to be said about this.22 For now I hope the following 
observations will suffice. Problems about transitivity already arise in the 
intrapersonal case for just about any atomistic theory.23 A person may have 
two different mental files for the same object but, upon discovering that 
there is in fact just one object, the two files may eventually fuse into a single 
one. Each of the earlier files may be transparently related to the later one, 
yet not transparently related to one another prior to fusion. The ‘same 
MOP’ relation thus fails to be transitive even in the intrapersonal case. 
The problem arises ultimately from the fact that atomistic theories do 
not regard the identity of a MOP as intrinsic to a given token, but instead 
give only criteria for sameness or difference of MOP between pairs of 
tokens. Consequently MOPs, as construed by atomists, are continuants; 
entities for which we can give continuity conditions, but which we cannot 
individuate merely by their intrinsic natures. There are many other 
continuants of this kind, including persons and composite physical objects. 
In all such cases there can be fission or fusion, and the metaphysical 
problems resulting from this are well known. The problems resulting from 
fission and fusion for MOPs are very similar to those that arise for 
psychological continuity theories of personal identity. For every type of 
solution on offer for personal identity there will be a corresponding type 
of solution for MOPs. My own view is that the best solution is given by 
stage theory (Sider 1996, 2001; Hawley 2001). The stage theory view of 
persons says that strictly speaking a person is an instantaneous temporal 
stage; a person persists by having many stages that stand in certain 
relations to one another. On the stage view it can be correct to say, for 
example, that I was once a child, but this is true if and only if there is a 
person at an earlier time who is a child and to whom I stand in an 
intransitive ‘I-relation’ (which may, for example, be a relation of 
psychological continuity). Something very similar could be said for MOPs. 
Strictly speaking the relation that we capture by saying that Brown thinks 
of O under the same MOP as Jones is not an identity relation but an 
intransitive transparency relation. But it is still exactly as true to say that I 
                                               
22 For the details of my own view, see [Prosser, MS] 
23 Failure of transitivity for mental files in the intrapersonal case is discussed by Pinillos 
(2011), following a brief indication of a similar problem by Fine (2007: 119). A similar 
problem was outlined by Taschek (1998). For one way to reply in the intrapersonal case 
see Recanati 2012: 104-112. 
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have retained a belief, or share a belief with someone else, as it is to say 
that I did various things in the past or will do various things in the future.24 
As I said, other solutions are possible for MOPs, just as they are for other 
continuants. I shall leave more detailed discussion of these matters for 
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